viding time constraints at the time scale that perception, action, and cognition interact.
Adaptive behavior. Section 2.3 of the target article emphasizes Newell's complaint regarding the functionality of then extant theories of short-term memory. In our attempts to build integrated cognitive systems, we too have had similar complaints. For example, the work by Altmann and Gray (Altmann 2002; Altmann & Gray 2002) on task switching was motivated by a failed attempt to use existing theories (e.g., Rogers & Monsell 1995) to understand the role played by task switching in a fast-paced, dynamic environment. Hence, one role of a unified architecture of cognition is that it allows a test of the functionality of its component theories.
Section 5.3 emphasizes the ability to tune models to the "statistical structure of the environment." For cognitive engineering, adaptation includes changes in task performance in response to changes in the task environment, such as when a familiar interface is updated or when additional tasks with new interfaces are introduced. In our experience, ACT-R has some success on the first of these, namely, predicting performance on variations of the same interface (Schoelles 2002; Schoelles & Gray 2003) . However, we believe that predicting performance in a multitask environment, perhaps by definition, will require building models of each task. Hence, it is not clear to us whether ACT-R or any other cognitive architecture can meet this critical need of cognitive engineering.
Dynamic behavior. The ability to model performance when the task environment, not the human operator, initiates change is vital for cognitive engineering. We can attest that ACT-R does well in modeling these situations (Ehret et al. 2000; Gray et al. 2000; 2002; Schoelles 2002) .
Learning. For many cognitive engineering purposes, learning is less important than the ability to generate a trace of a task analysis of expert or novice performance. With all learning "turned off," ACT-R's emphasis on real-time performance and dynamic behavior makes it well suited for such purposes.
Learning is required to adapt to changes in an existing task environment or to show how a task analysis of novice behavior could, with practice, result in expert behavior. ACT-R's subsymbolic layer has long been capable of tuning a fixed set of production rules to a task environment. However, a viable mechanism for learning new rules had been lacking. With the new production compilation method of Taatgen (see Taatgen & Lee 2003) this situation may have changed.
Consciousness. A&L's discussion of consciousness includes much that cognitive engineering does not need, as well as some that it does. Our focus here is on one aspect: the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge and the means by which implicit knowledge becomes explicit.
Siegler (Siegler & Lemaire 1997; Siegler & Stern 1998) has demonstrated that the implicit use of a strategy may precede conscious awareness and conscious, goal-directed application of that strategy. ACT-R cannot model such changes because it lacks a mechanism for generating top-down, goal-directed cognition from bottom-up, least-effort-driven adaptations.
Conclusions: Meeting Newell's other challenge. Unified architectures of cognition have an important role to play in meeting Newell's other challenge, namely, creating a rigorous and scientifically based discipline of cognitive engineering. Of the six criteria discussed here, ACT-R scores one best, four better, and one worse, whereas classical connectionism scores two better, two mixed, and two worse. We take this as evidence supporting our choice of ACT-R rather than connectionism as an architecture for cognitive engineering. But, in the same sense that A&L judge that ACT-R has a ways to go to pass the Newell Test, we judge that ACT-R has a ways to go to meet the needs of cognitive engineering. As the Newell Test criteria become better defined, we hope that they encourage ACT-R and other architectures to develop in ways that support cognitive engineering. The authors' use of the nomenclature, "classical connectionist models," falsely suggests that such models satisfy the Newell criteria better than other neural models of cognition. The authors then dichotomize ACT with "classical" connectionism based on its "failure to acknowledge a symbolic level to thought. In contrast, ACT-R includes both symbolic and subsymbolic components" (target article, Abstract). Actually, neural models of cognition such as ART include both types of representation and clarify how they are learned. Moreover, ART was introduced before the "classical" models (Grossberg 1976; 1978a; 1980) Critiques of classical connectionist models, here called CM (Carnegie Mellon) connectionism, show that many such models cannot exist in the brain (e.g., Grossberg 1988; Grossberg et al. 1997b; Grossberg & Merrill 1996) . We claim that ART satisfies many Newell criteria better, with the obvious caveat that no model is as yet a complete neural theory of cognition.
Flexible behavior. ART models are self-organizing neural production systems capable of fast, stable, real-time learning about arbitrarily large, unexpectedly changing environments (Carpenter & Grossberg 1991) . These properties suit ART for large-scale technological applications, ranging from control of mobile robots, face recognition, remote sensing, medical diagnosis, and electrocardiogram analysis to tool failure monitoring, chemical analysis, circuit design, protein/DNA analysis, musical analysis, and seismic, sonar, and radar recognition, in both software and VLSI microchips (e.g., Carpenter & Milenova 2000; Carpenter et al. 1999; Granger et al. 2001 ). The criticism of CM connectionism "that complex, sequentially organized, hierarchical behavior" cannot be modeled also does not apply to ART (e.g., Bradski et al. 1994; Cohen & Grossberg 1986; Grossberg 1978a; Grossberg & Kuperstein 1989; Grossberg & Myers 2000 ; also see the section on dynamic behavior later in this commentary).
Real-time performance. ART models are manifestly real-time in design, unlike CM connectionist models.
Adaptive behavior. ART provides a rigorous solution of the stability-plasticity dilemma, which was my term for catastrophic forgetting before that phrase was coined. "Limitations like shortterm memory" (target article, sect. 5.3) can be derived from the LTM Invariance Principle, which proposes how working memories are designed to enable their stored event sequences to be stably chunked and remembered (Bradski et al. 1994; Grossberg 1978a; 1978b) .
Vast knowledge base. ART can directly access the globally best-matching information in its memory, no matter how much it has learned. It includes additional criteria of value and temporal relevance through its embedding in START models that include cognitive-emotional and adaptive timing circuits in addition to cognitive ART circuits (Grossberg & Merrill 1992; 1996) . Dynamic behavior. "Dealing with dynamic behavior requires a theory of perception and action as well as a theory of cognition" (sect. 2.5). LAMINART models propose how ART principles are incorporated into perceptual neocortical circuits and how highlevel cognitive constraints can modulate lower perceptual representations through top-down matching and attention (Grossberg 1999a; Raizada & Grossberg 2003) . ART deals with novelty through complementary interactions between attentional and orienting systems (Grossberg 1999b; 2000b) , the former including corticocortical, and the latter, hippocampal, circuits. Action circuits also obey laws that are complementary to those used in perception and cognition (Grossberg 2000b), notably VAM (Vector Associative Map) laws. VAM-based models have simulated identified brain cells and circuits and the actions that they control (e.g., Brown et al. 1999; Bullock et al. 1998; Contreras-Vidal et al. 1997; Fiala et al. 1996; Gancarz & Grossberg 1999; Grossberg et al. 1997 ), including models of motor skill learning and performance (Bullock et al. 1993a; 1993b; Grossberg & Paine 2000) .
Knowledge integration. ART reconciles distributed and symbolic representations using its concept of resonance. Individual features are meaningless, just as pixels in a picture are meaningless. A learned category, or symbol, is sensitive to the global patterning of features but cannot represent the contents of the experience, including their conscious qualia, because of the very fact that a category is a compressed, or symbolic, representation. Resonance between these two types of information converts the pattern of attended features into a coherent context-sensitive state that is linked to its symbol through feedback. This coherent state, which binds distributed features and symbolic categories, can enter consciousness. ART predicts that all conscious states are resonant states. In particular, resonance binds spatially distributed features into a synchronous equilibrium or oscillation. Such synchronous states attracted interest after being reported in neurophysiological experiments. They were predicted in the 1970s when ART was introduced (see Grossberg 1999b). Recent neurophysiological experiments have supported other ART predictions (Engel et al. 2001; Pollen 1999; Raizada & Grossberg 2003) . Fuzzy ART learns explicitly decodable Fuzzy IF-THEN rules (Carpenter et al. 1992) . Thus ART accommodates symbols and rules, as well as subsymbolic distributed computations.
Natural language. ART has not yet modeled language. Rather, it is filling a gap that ACT-R has left open: "ACT-R lacks any theory of the processes of speech perception or speech production" (sect. 4.5, para. 3). ART is clarifying the perceptual units of speech perception, word recognition, working memory, and sequential planning chunks on which the brain builds language (e.g., Boardman et al. 1999; Bradski et al. 1994; Grossberg 1978a; 1978b; 1999b; Grossberg et al. 1997a; Grossberg & Myers 2000; Grossberg & Stone 1986a; 1986b) . Such studies suggest that a radical rethinking of psychological space and time is needed to understand language and to accommodate such radical claims as, "Conscious speech is a resonant wave" (cf. Grossberg, 1999b) . ACT-R also does not have "mechanisms . . . [of ] perceptual recognition, mental imagery, emotion, and motivation" (sect. 4.5). These are all areas where ART has detailed models (e.g., Grossberg 2000a; 2000c). Speech production uses complementary VAM-like mechanisms (Callan et al. 2000; Guenther 1995) . After perceptual units in vision became sufficiently clear, rapid progress ensued at all levels of vision (cf. http://www.cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg). This should also happen for language.
Development. ART has claimed since 1976 that processes of cortical development in the infant are on a continuum with processes of learning in the adult, a prediction increasingly supported recently (e.g., Kandel & O'Dell 1992) .
Evolution. "Cognitive plasticity . . . What enables this plasticity in the architecture?" (sect. 5.11). ART clarifies how the ability to
